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Publicly Detectable Watermarking for Intellectual
Property Authentication in VLSI Design
Gang Qu
Abstract—Highlighted with the newly released intellectual property
(IP) protection white paper by VSI Alliance, the protection of virtual
components or IPs in very large scale integration (VLSI) design has
received a great deal of attention recently. Digital signature/watermark
is one of the most promising solutions among the known protection
mechanisms. It provides desirable proof of authorship without rendering
the IP useless. However, it makes the watermark detection, which is as
important as watermarking, an NP-hard problem. In fact, the tradeoff be-
tween hard-to-attack and easy-to-detect and the lack of efficient detection
schemes are the major obstacles for digital signatures to thrive. In this
paper, the authors propose a new watermarking method which allows the
watermark to be publicly detected without losing its strength and security.
The basic idea is to create a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
watermark, embed it into the original problem as a special (which the
authors call mutual exclusive) constraint, and make it public. The authors
combine data integrity technique and the unique characteristics in the
design of VLSI IPs such that adversaries will not gain any advantage from
the public watermarking for forgery. This new technique is compatible
with the existing constraint-based watermarking/fingerprinting tech-
niques. The resulting public–private watermark maintains the strength of
a watermark and provides easy detectability with little design overhead.
The authors build the mathematical framework for this approach based
on the concept of mutual exclusive constraints. They use popular VLSI
CAD problems, namely technology mapping, partitioning, graph coloring,
FPGA design, and Boolean satisfiability, to demonstrate the public
watermark’s easy detectability, high credibility, low design overhead, and
robustness.
Index Terms—Authentication, copy detection, data integrity, informa-
tion hiding, intellectual property protection, mutual exclusive constraints,
virtual component, watermarking.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in very large scale integration (VLSI) semiconductor
technology and the system-on-a-chip design paradigm, coupled with
the shrinking time-to-market window, have changed the traditional
system design methodology. Design reuse and intellectual property
(IP), also called virtual component, based designs have become
more and more important. IP trading plays a central role in the
design-for-reuse methodology and the potential of infringement is
growing fast. However, the global awareness of IP protection remains
low. The goals of IP protection are to enable IP providers to protect
their IPs against unauthorized use and to detect and to trace the use
of IPs [22].
According to the IP protection white paper released recently by
VSIA, there are three approaches to the problem of securing an IP:
deterrent approaches like patents, copyrights, and trade secrets; pro-
tection via licensing agreements or encryption; detection mechanisms
such as physical tagging, digital watermarking, and fingerprinting
[22]. Of the early efforts on IP protection, only detection mechanisms
enable designers to do the so-called self-protection. Other approaches
require either time, or money, or both. Using the detection methods,
designers embed digital signatures or other traceable marks into IPs
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during the design and implementation phases, such that unauthorized
usage can be detected and the source of theft can be traced. There are
three main detection mechanisms: 1)tagging and tracking techniques,
where labels are attached to IPs in the manufacturing phase for the
purpose of tracing [23], [27]; 2)digital watermarking techniques,
where digital signatures are hidden in the design such that they can be
later revealed by IP owners to show authorship [3], [8], [10], [14]; and
3) fingerprinting techniques, where a unique copy of IP is created to
trace each individual user [2], [12].
Clearly the success of digital signatures relies on their detectability
and traceability. Therefore, developing efficient detection techniques is
essential to the protection mechanism and is as important as developing
watermarking techniques. However, the general copy detection process
is equivalent to the problems of pattern matching or subgraph isomor-
phism which are well-known NP-hard and most of the existing wa-
termarking/fingerprinting literature leave this as an open challenging
problem [7], [10]. Compared to watermarking and fingerprinting, we
see the research on copy detection lacking both in breadth and in depth.
To date, three different approaches for copy detection in VLSI designs
have been reported.
For several instances (namely scheduling, graph coloring, and gate-
level layout), Kahnget al.[9] choose signatures selectively and develop
fast comparison schemes to detect such signatures. To enable these fast
comparison algorithms, one has to first identify a common structural
representation of IPs and what constitutes an element of the IP struc-
ture; secondly, one has to determine a means of calculating locally con-
text-dependent signatures for such elements. Although this approach is
generic, it is not always easy to find such a common structure and to
design fast and accurate pattern matching algorithms.
Charbon and Torunoglu [4] discuss copy detection under a design
environment that involves IPs from multiple sources and that requires
IP providers to register their IPs in a trusted agent. They first generate
a compact signature from every IP block independently and make it
public. Then they perform the IP integration process in a way such that
one can extract the signatures from the final design. This approach re-
quires every IP provider to deposit his signature into a “bank” main-
tained by a third party. And again, matching algorithms need to be de-
veloped to detect signatures from a circuit.
More recently, Kirovskiet al. [11] propose a forensic engineering
technique to identify solutions generated by strategically different al-
gorithms. They first run each algorithm on a large number of instances
to collect statistical data, then these algorithms are clustered based on
the properties of solutions they find. To detect which algorithm is ap-
plied to obtain a given solution, they simply check its properties based
on which the algorithm clustering has been performed.
In the broader area of information hiding, most of the reported liter-
ature on detection focuses on how to extract and recover the embedded
data with the secret key from the stego-data [15]. There are only two
existing approaches to make watermarks publicly detectable. One is
based on the so-called public-key watermarking [6], the other relies on
zero-knowledge protocols [5].
In this paper, we propose a new watermarking technique to solve
the copy detection problem. The core concept is to divide the water-
mark into two parts: the public part which is made visible to the public,
and the private part which is only visible for authorized people. Both
the public and private watermark are in the form of additional design
constraints. Their difference is that the public watermark is embedded
in designated locations with known methods to guarantee public de-
tectability, while the private part is embedded in a secret way as in
the traditional constraint-based watermark. We use cryptographic tech-
niques for data integrity to deter any attempt of removing or modifying
the public watermark. The separation of public watermark and private
w t rmark provides the following advantages.
• It facilitates easy public copy detection. A relatively convincing
authorship can be verified by end users, in constant time,
without forensic experts. This to a great extent deters illegal
redistribution.
• The public watermark is hard to forge because it is generated by
a data integrity technique and embedded in the design process of
VLSI IPs.
• The new technique is compatible with all existing water-
marking/fingerprinting methods. The performance overhead to
gain easy and public detectability is little.
• Each public watermark is guaranteed to be distinct, which means
that a 100% credibility will be achieved (from the public part
only) if this method is adopted by all IP providers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
explain the creation, embedding, and detection of the public–private
watermark. We introduce the concept ofmutual exclusive constraints
and build the theoretical background for the generic public water-
marking technique in Section III. This approach can be applied to
many well-studied problems in the context of VLSI such as Boolean
satisfiability (SAT), partitioning, field-programmable gate array
(FPGA) layout, technology mapping, and graph coloring. We validate
the public watermarking technique and report experimental results on
SAT and graph coloring before we draw conclusions in Section V.
II. PUBLIC-PRIVATE WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE
Watermarking and fingerprinting are indirect protection schemes in
that they provide a deterrent to infringers by providing the ability to
demonstrate ownership of an IP to its originator [22]. However, es-
tablishing the ownership is challenging as we have discussed earlier.
In this section, we propose the public–private watermarking technique
that simultaneously provides credibility as high as any traditional con-
straint-based watermark and the public detectability that no other wa-
termarks can.
Watermark Creation:The proposed public–private watermark con-
sists of two parts: public and private, which are selected separately.
We inherit the private part of the watermark from the traditional digital
watermark discussed in early works [2], [7], [8], [10], [14]. A typical
watermark is a cryptographically strong pseudo-random bit stream cre-
ated by crypto systems using designer’s digital signature as the secret
key. For example, we can hash the plain text message to get a 128-bit
or higher hash result. We then apply a stream cipher to make the same
plain text message pseudo random using the above hash result as the
key. The public watermark has a header and a body that are both derived
from ashortplain text message such as the four- or three-letter symbol
for the design company. The ASCII code of this short text is used as
the public watermark header. The public watermark body, which is a
pseudo-random bit stream, is created exactly the same way as we build
the private watermark.
Watermark Embedding:Watermark embedding is the process of
translating the watermark, a pseudo-random bit stream, into design
onstraints. The public and private watermark can be embedded by
either the same encoding scheme or different ones. The development
of such schemes requires us to explore the characteristics of the given
problem and we will discuss this in Section IV on several specific VLSI
CAD problems. However, to ensure the detectability of public water-
mark, we must make the following public: 1) the one-way hash func-
tion being used in the construction of public watermark; 2) the (public)
watermark encoding scheme being used to create the constraints; and
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3) the place where we embed these (public watermark related) con-
straints. We keep the secret key out of the reach of public to make the
private watermark secure1 .
Watermark Detection:The public watermark can be detected from
the following public information: 1) the hash function; 2) the water-
mark scheme; and 3) the place that hosts the (public) watermark. First,
we check for the existence of constraints in the hosts for public water-
mark and obtain the entire public watermark message. Next, we extract
the message header (since its length is known), which is the designer’s
public signature in ASCII. Then, we can hash this message header for
further verification of the authorship. A match of the message header
with designer’s publicly known signature gives the first level proof of
authorship. A match of the message body with the new hash result will
establish stronger proof. Finally, further evidence can be shown when
the secret key (for the private watermark) is available or forensic tools
can be used to detect the private watermark by the existing copy detec-
tion techniques [4], [9], [11].
Watermark Robustness:Unlike the private watermark, which is as
secure as before, the public watermark is visible to the public and may
be vulnerable against attacks. In most known watermarking techniques,
attackers will have a great amount of advantage if they can detect the
watermark. The public watermark exploits the concept ofdata integrity
to prevent this. To be more specific, a forgery is successful if the ad-
versary can replace the original public watermark by his public infor-
mation. The adversary can create his own public watermark using the
published hash function. Then he can alter the constraints based on
the public-known watermark encoding scheme and embed them in the
specific places. Finally, he modifies the known solution, which satis-
fies the original public watermark, to meet his faked public watermark
constraints. Now a successful forgery is built! However, this is unre-
alistic2 , if not impossible, due to two facts: 1) the faked hash will be
different from the original in half of the bits statistically even if the
message header is changed only by one bit, which is significant if we
make the message body sufficiently long. 2) the design integrity im-
plies that even one small local change may alter the behavior of the
design, which means that any forgery will require some level of local
modification.
III. T HEORY OFPUBLIC WATERMARKING
Public watermarking differs from traditional (or private) water-
marking in the way the watermark is embedded into the design as
additional constraints. It is the basic assumption that watermark should
be “invisible” [3], [7], [8], [18]. It is also this assumption that makes
watermark detection hard. In the public watermarking approach, the
watermark is embedded into a special type of constraints, which we
call public watermark holder, using a known encoding scheme. We
have already discussed in the previous section about the creation,
embedding, detection, and robustness of public watermark. In this
section, we give a summary of the mathematic foundation for con-
structing public watermark holders. A detailed description can be
found in the technical report [16].
We embed the public watermark by adding a special type of con-
straint: mutual exclusive constraints. Given a problemP , a set ofn  2
constraints {C1; C2; . . . ; Cn} are mutual exclusiveif any solutionS
satisfies at most one constraintCi, (1  i  n). A mutual exclusive
1The security of the cryptographic function depends on the secret key, not on
which hash function or stream cipher we use to encrypt the message. Also, it is
the digital signature, which is independent of the watermark encoding schemes,
that carries the proof of authorship.
2By unrealistic, we mean that the performance degradation of the modified
IP is so large that one will not accept it and the design loses its value.
set of constraints iscompleteif any solutionS satisfies exactly one con-
straint. A mutual exclusive set isstrongly mutual exclusiveif for any
constraintCi, there exists a solutionS that satisfiesCi and violatesCj
(j 6= i).
Existence Theorem:A complete strongly mutual exclusive set ex-
ists for all problems with more than two different solutions.
Cutting Space Theorem:A set of complete strongly mutual exclu-
sive constraints partitions the solution space as the union of nonempty
disjoint subsets.
Data Hiding Theorem:n different pieces of information (of any
length) can be hidden with a (complete) strongly mutual exclusive set
of n constraints.
Intuitively, each user will be assigned one constraint from a set of
complete strongly mutual exclusive constraints for his public water-
mark holder. When the watermarked problem is solved, solution will
only come from the subset that satisfies this constraint. From the cut-
ting space theorem, we conclude that there will not be any collision3
among different watermark holders. This essentially provides the ulti-
mate 100% proof of the authorship and it is independent of the length
of the public watermark. Clearly, it is of our interest to find large com-
plete strongly mutual exclusive sets to accommodate the possible large
number of public watermarks. We now introduce a constructive method
to construct large complete mutual exclusive sets.
Two constraints areindependentif any solution’s satisfiability to one
constraint has no impact on its satisfiability to the other one. Two sets
of constraints, {C1; C2; . . . ; Cn} and {C01; C
0
2; . . . ; C
0
m}, are indepen-
dentif Ci andC 0j are independent for any1  i  n, and1  j  m.
The join of two sets of constraints, {C1; . . . ; Cn} and {C 01; . . . ; C
0
m},




1; . . . ; Cn^C
0
m},
where constraintCi ^C 0j is satisfied if and only if both constraintsCi
andC 0j are satisfied.
Join Theorem: If two complete strong mutual exclusive sets are in-
dependent and haven andm constraints, respectively, then their join
is a complete strong mutual exclusive set withn m constraints.
We summarize the public watermarking approach as follows.
1) Build a public watermark holder:
1) Obtain a group of complete strongly mutual exclu-
sive and independent constraintsfC1; C 01g; fC2; C
0
2g;
. . . ; fCk; C
0
kg.
2) Construct their join{ Ci ^ Ci ^    ^ Ci : Ci = Ci
or C 0i }.
2) Create a public watermark:
1) Convert (plain text) public signature into an ASCII bit-
streamPS .
2) HashPS by a one-way hash function to get the hash result
H(PS).
3) EncodeH(PS) by a stream cipher withPS as the key to
getSCPS(H(PS).
4) public watermark= PS  SCPS(H(PS), where is the
string concatenation.
3) Embed the public watermark:
1) For public watermarkp1p2 . . . pk, we choose public wa-
termark holderC1 ^    ^ Ck, where Ci = Ci if pi = 0
and Ci = C 0i if pi = 1.
2) Embed constraints{ C1; . . . ; Ck} into design.
The stego-problem is obtained by addingTHEconstraints that corre-
spond to the public watermark under the embedding scheme in Step 3.
The strongly mutual exclusiveness guarantees the existence of stego-
solution (or watermarked solutions) to the stego-problem. Different
3A collision occurs when one solution meets more than one public watermark.
In such a situation, one cannot identify the real author(s) and the watermark fails.
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Fig. 1. Hamming distance among the four public watermark message. The
bottom half comes from the message header (plain text part), and the top half
comes from the message body (results of RC4).
watermarks will be mapped to different constraints of the strongly mu-
tual exclusive set. Therefore, all stego-problems will be different and
the property of mutual exclusiveness guarantees their solutions will be
distinct. In sum, we have the following.
Theorem (Correctness of the Approach):If the constraints are
strongly mutual exclusive, there always exist (stego-) solutions for
the stego-problem. Furthermore, different stego-problems will have
different (stego-)solutions that are all solutions to the original problem.
IV. V ALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have explained how to create the public–private watermark
which is a pseudo-random bit stream (except the header of public wa-
termark). We have conducted case studies on several well-known VLSI
CAD problems to validate this approach. In this section, we report the
results on SAT and graph coloring problems to demonstrate the public
watermark’s robustness and its impact to the system’s performance
(or quality of the solution). Detailed results on other problems, such as
partitioning, standard cell place and route, technology mapping, and
FPGA layout can be found in the technical report [16].
A. Boolean Satisfiability
The Boolean SAT seeks to decide, for a given formula, whether there
is a truth assignment for its variables that makes the formula true. SAT
appears in many contexts in the field of VLSI CAD, such as auto-
matic pattern generation, logic verification, timing analysis, delay fault
testing, and channel routing. We necessarily assume that the SAT in-
stance to be protected is satisfiable and that there is a large enough
solution space to accommodate the watermark.
Given a formulaF on a set of Boolean variablesV , the simplest
watermarking technique for public detectability is to hide the public
watermark behind a known subset of variables {v1; v2; . . . ; vk}. Sup-
pose the public watermark message ismk . . .m2m1, we embed it by
forcingvi = mi in the solution. This can be done by adding a single-lit-
eral clausevi (if mi = 1) or v0i (if mi = 0)4 to the formulaF .
We pick four four-letter messages A, B, C, and D. We use MD5
[19], [25] as the one-way hash function to obtain four 128-bit messages
H(A), H(B), H(C), and H(D). Next we use RC4 [26] to encrypt these
messages using their ASCII codes as the encryption keys. The resulting
pseudo-random bit streams are appended to the ASCII codes of the
corresponding plain text to form the four public watermark messages.
Fig. 1 shows the Hamming distance for each of the six pairs among
these four public watermark message. A and B, B and D are relatively
close because each pair has one letter in common accidentally.5
We now embed these public watermark messages to DIMACS SAT
benchmarks, where the instances are generated from the problem of
inferring the logic in an eight-input, one-output “blackbox” [28]. We
first select 32 variables for the message header, then choose 128 (or
64 for instances of small size, e.g., with less than 600 variables) more
variables for the message body. We then assign values to these variables
based on the public watermark and solve for the assignment of the rest
variables to get the original solution.
With the given solution (and variables that carry the public water-
mark), an adversary retrieves the public message header, modifies it,
and computes the new message body. He then embeds this forged mes-
sage and resolves the problem. Our goal is to show that there is little
correlation between the original solution and adversary’s new solu-
tion, i.e., attacker has little advantage from the original solution or it
is equally difficult to obtain a solution.
Table I shows our experimental results, where messages A, B, C,
D are embedded to the four SAT instances, respectively. The second
column gives the number of variablesN in these instances. We con-
sider the adversary changes randomly 4, 8, 16, and 24 bits in the 32-bit
message header. We repeat each trial five times, the columns labeled
“body” show the average number of bits changed in the faked message
body from the original. We solve each instance with this faked message
(both header and body) embedded and calculate the Hamming distance
between the new solution and the original solution. The average dis-
tances (rounded to the nearest integer) are reported in columns with
the label “sol.”.
The last two rows report these average distances percentage-wise.
The first is the distance in public domain, which is very close to 50% if
we exclude the mandatory header part. It is independent of the number
of bits being modified in the header and shows the robustness of our
cryptographic tools in generating pseudo-random bit streams. The last
row shows that the new solutions are not close to the original solution.
(When we solve the original instances for multiple solution, their av-
erage distance is also about 45%.) Therefore, we can conclude that the
new solutions are independent of the given solution, which means that
once the public watermark has been modified, the adversary loses al-
most all the advantage from the given solution. This is further verified
by the fact that the run time difference for resolving the problem and
solving from scratch is so small (within 5%) that we consider they are
the same.
4A single-literal clause imposes a very strong constraint to the formula. Sta-
tistically it will cut the entire solution space by one-half. Therefore, we may use
a short public watermark message, in particular for instances with not so many
variables. However, the credibility can always be enhanced by adding private
watermark using other techniques, such as those proposed in [8].
5The ASCII codes for messages A, B, C, and D are: “01 010 011 01 000 111
01 001 001 00 100 000”, “01 000 011 01 000 100 01 001 110 00 100 000”,
“01 010 011 01 001 110 01 010 000 01 010 011”, and “01 001 101 01 000 101
01 001 110 01 010 100”.
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TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DIFFERENTBITS IN PUBLIC MESSAGEBODY (“BODY”), AVERAGE DISTANCE (ROUNDED TO INTEGER) FROM THE ORIGINAL SOLUTION
(“SOL.”) WHEN 4-, 8-, 16-,AND 32-BIT FORGERYIS CONDUCTED TO THEPUBLIC MESSAGEHEADER ON SAT BENCHMARKS
Fig. 2. Four GC solutions with different public watermarks added to the same
graph. Letters beside the nodes stand for the colors: Y(ellow), B(lue), R(ed),
G(reen).
B. Graph Coloring
The NP-hard graph vertex coloring optimization seeks to color a
given graph with as few colors as possible, such that no two adjacent
vertices receive the same color. We propose the following public–pri-
vate watermarking technique for the graph coloring problem and use it
to demonstrate the impact of our approach on the quality of the solution.
For a given graph, we select pairs of vertices that are not connected
directly by an edge. We hide one bit of information behind each pair
as follows: adding one edge between the two vertices and thus making
them colored by different colors to embed 1; collapsing this pair and
thus forcing them to receive the same color to embed 0.
Consider Fig. 2, where two pairs of unconnected vertices, nodes 0
and 7, and nodes 1 and 8, are selected as shown in the dashed circles
in 2(a). The rest of Fig. 2 shows four different coloring schemes with a
TABLE II
EMBEDDING PUBLIC WATERMARK TO REAL LIFE GRAPH
AND RANDOMIZED GRAPH
2-bit public watermark message embedded. To detect such watermark,
one can simply check the colors received by nodes 0, 1, 7, and 8.
For example, in Fig. 2(c), nodes 0 and 7 are colored by G(reen) and
Y(ellow), respectively, which means the first bit (the most significant
bit) is 0. Similarly, the observation that nodes 1 and 8 are both colored
by R(ed) tells us the second bit of the message is 1. Therefore, we detect
a public message “01”.
To evaluate the tradeoff between protection and solution degradation
(in the case of graph coloring, the number of extra colors), we first color
the original graph, then color the watermarked graph and compare the
average number of colors required. We consider two classes of real life
graphs (thefpsol2and inithx instances from [29]) and the DIMACS
on-line challenge graph [28].
Table II shows the number of vertices in each graph, the optimal
solutions except the DSJC1000 problem which is still open (the number
in the table for this problem is the average of ten trials with 85-color
solutions occur several times), and the overhead introduced by public
watermark messages of various length. For each instance, we create ten
32-bit and ten 64-bit public watermark messages randomly. We add
the message to the graph and color the modified graph. The average
number of colors and the best solution we find are reported. One can
easily see that the proposed approach causes little overhead for real life
instances but loses best solutions for the randomized DSJC1000 graph.
The reason is that there exist localities in real life graphs of which we
can take advantage. However, such localities do not exist or are very
difficult to find in random graphs.
V. CONCLUSION
Our work is motivated by the proliferation of IP reuse in VLSI de-
sign and the potential of it being illegally redistributed and misused. We
p opose a public–private watermarking method, the first that allows the
IP’s authorship to be established easily and publicly. We achieve this
by allowing part of the watermark to be public. We use cryptographic
techniques, in particular techniques for data integrity, to protect the
public watermark from forgery. Using the traditional constraint-based
watermark as private part, this public–private watermarking scheme is
capable of providing public detectability with no degradation on the
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watermark’s strength. We explain the basic approach and develop spe-
cific techniques for various classes of VLSI CAD problems. The new
approach is compatible with all the existing watermarking techniques.
With the help from organizations pushing for design standards, for ex-
ample VSIA, this method has the potential of solving eventually the IP
protection problem.
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Preferred Direction Steiner Trees
Mehmet Can Yildiz and Patrick H. Madden
Abstract—The planar rectilinear Steiner tree problem has been exten-
sively studied. The common formulation ignores circuit fabrication issues
such as multiple routing layers, preferred routing directions, and vias
between layers. In this paper, the authors extend a previously presented
planar rectilinear Steiner tree heuristic to consider layer assignment,
preferred routing direction restrictions, and via minimization. They
use layer-specific routing costs, via costs, and have a minimum cost
objective. Their approach combines the low computational complexity
of modern geometry-based methods with much of the freedom enjoyed
by graph-based methods. When routing costs mirror those of traditional
planar rectilinear Steiner problems, the authors’ approach obtains close
to 11% reductions in tree lengths, compared to minimum spanning trees;
this is on par with the performance of the best available Steiner heuristics.
When via costs are significant and layer costs differ, they observe average
cost reductions of as much as 37%. Their method can also reduce the
number of vias significantly.
Index Terms—Interconnect synthesis, optimization, routing, Steiner tree.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Steiner problem has a long history in very large scale inte-
gration (VLSI) computer-aided design; global and detail routers use
Steiner trees to define routes for signal nets, and many interconnect
optimization approaches begin with Steiner constructions and then
apply wire sizing, driver sizing, and buffer insertion to improve
performance. Steiner tree research has focused onplanar rectilinear
formulations, which are appropriate for single layer routing and are
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